Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear June	12, 2016 In	her	new	book Manifest	Reality Lucy	Allais	articulates	a	series	of	compelling	criticisms	of both	epistemological	and	phenomenalist	readings	of	Kant, while	advancing	a	new	"moderate" metaphysical	interpretation	of	Kant's	transcendental	idealism. Along	the	way, Allais	provides a	substantive	elaboration	of	Kant's	theory	of	cognition, and	in	particular, on	the	nature	of, and relation	between, the	cognitive	faculties	of	sensibility	and	understanding, and	their	characteristic representational	output	of	intuitions	and	concepts. One	of the	central	contributions	of	Allais'	discussion	of intuition is	her	emphasis	on the importance	of	taking	seriously	Kant's	conception	of	intuition	as	a	singular	and	immediate	representation that	gives	us	objects. According to	Allais, intuitions	"give	us	acquaintance	with objects"	(147), by	which	she	means	that	spatio-temporal	particulars	are	perceptually	presented in	intuition, and	it	is	in	virtue	of	our	being	acquainted	with	such	particulars	that	we	are	in	a position	to	form	thoughts	concerning	them. I think	that	there	is	much	that	is	correct	in	Allais' interpretation	of	Kant's	notion	of	intuition, and	much	to	admire	in	her	expression	of	it. The	view she	articulates	is	a	clear	and	forceful	expression	of	central	elements	of	Kant's	mature	thought	on our	cognition	of	reality. I focus	here, somewhat	narrowly, on	Allais'	conception	of	intuition	as	acquaintance. I discuss	three	points. First, I review	Allais'	interpretation	of	intuition	as	providing	acquaintance	with a	perceptual	particular. I raise	some	questions	for	this	view	including	how	the	epistemological and	metaphysical	aspects	of	the	view	are	supposed	to	fit	together. Second, I examine	Allais' discussion	of	the	cognitive	role	of	intuition. I raise	two	worries. First, that	her	exposition	of	intuition's	cognitive	role	is	undercut	by	her	view	that	referential	thought	requires	merely	possible acquaintance. Second, that	the	acquaintance	condition	on	referential	thought	is	implausibly strong, and	is	better	considered	as	part	of	a	condition	on	cognition. Finally, in	section	three, I raise	some	questions	concerning	the	role	of	the	categories	in	the	having	of	intuition. I object	that the	semantic	role	which	intuition	is	supposed	to	play	stands	in	tension	with	Allais'	conception of	the	role	of	the	categories. 1 The	Nature	of	Intuition Allais	argues	that	interpretations	of	Kant's	mature	view	often	fail	to	take	seriously	his	account	of intuition	(146). As	is	well	known, Kant	distinguishes	intuitions	from	concepts	by	virtue	of	the former's	"immediacy"	and	"singularity"	in	contrast	with	the	latter's	"mediacy"	and	"generality" (A320/B377; see	also	A19	and	A50/B74). Intuitions	are	what give us	objects, while	concepts allow	us	to	think	about	them	(A19/B33, A239/B298, A719/B747). Allais	provides	a	very	specific gloss	on	what	we	should	understand	Kant	to	mean	by	the	characterization	of	intuition	as	an immediate, singular	representation	which	gives	an	object. 1	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear I argue	that	the singularity of	intuitions	should	be	understood	as	their	presenting perceptual	particulars, that	the immediacy of	intuitions	should	be	understood	as their	giving	us acquaintance with	or presenting the	particulars	they	represent, and that	this	is	what	it	means	to	say	that	intuitions give us	objects. Intuitions	give	us acquaintance	with	objects	(147) So, on	Allais' view	of intuition, its singularity	consists in its	presenting	a	"particular", while its immediacy	consists in the	acquaintance	relation that the	subject	stands in to the intuited particular. Let's	unpack	a	bit further the	notions	of	a "particular"	and	of "acquaintance"	as Allais	understands	them. According	to	Allais, a	"perceptual	particular"	is a	thing	which	a	subject	singles	out	as	a	perceptual	unit-a	distinct, bounded	thing to	which	the	subject	can	pay	perceptual	attention. This	could	be	a	causally	unitary object, but	could	also	be	less	than, or	more	than, an	object. A subject	may	intuit, for	example, a	desk	and	the	lamp	attached	to	it, or	may	attend	just	to	the	light	bulb in	the	lamp. A spot	of	light	moving	on	a	wall	could	be	a	perceptual	particular-it is	something	outside	of	and	other	than	the	subject, that	the	subject	can	pick	out	as a	unit. (147, note	2) Allais, following	Golob	(2011), construes	a	perceptual	unit	in	terms	of	Kant's	notion	of	a "basic	measure"	[Grundmass]	(5:251ff; see	Allais'	discussion	at	171, note	46). The	basic	measure "refers to the	explanatorily	primitive	capacity for the representation	of a	determinate spatial extent, or	a	unit	of	spatial	representation"	(Golob	2011: 509). Depending	on	context, the	basic measure	can	vary. What	a	creature	tends	to	attend	to	as	a	basic	perceptual	unit	can	vary, depending on	context	(I could	see	the	hill	and	the	trees	on	it	as	a	unity, from	a	distance, and a	leaf	as	a	singular	thing	up	close)	and	can	be	determined	by	biologically	driven principles	of	association	(what	size, for	example, its	prey	typically	is). (171, note 46) So	the	perceptual	particulars	given	to	a	subject	via	intuition	can	vary, depending	on	a	variety	of	factors	including	the	subject's	relation	to	the	object, the	subject's	biological	needs, and (presumably)	the	nature	and	sensitivity	of	the	subject's	sensory	organs. Perceptual	particulars may	in	fact	be	comprised	of	multiple	distinct	objects, or	they	may	not	be	"objects"	in	any	robust sense	at	all, as	with	shadows	and	patches	of	light	(see	147, note	2; 154, note	18; 156). Hence, the	singularity	of	intuition	is	based	on	the	fact	that	what	is	presented	in	a	single	intuition	is	one perceptual	unit, not	in	the	fact	that	this	perceptual	unit	itself	consists	of	one	object	or	thing. One initial	worry	about	this	construal	of	the	singularity	of	intuition	is	that	it	focuses	on	the	singularity of	presentation	rather	than	the	singularity	of	what	is	so	presented. We'll	return	to	this	point	in the	final	section	below. For	Allais, the	immediacy	of	intuition	consists	in	the	fact	that	via	intuition	a	subject	is	"acquainted	with	an	object"	(or	more	accurately, with	what	is	presented	as, or	in, a	single	perceptual unit). It	isn't	clear	whether	Allais	considers	acquaintance	to	be	an	epistemic	relation	to	the	object	(as	would	be	indicated	by	using	it	to	gloss	Kant's	notion	of	immediacy)	or	as	a	metaphysical 2	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear feature	of	the	psychological	state	one	is	in	when	intuiting	an	object, or	as	both. Certainly, Allais repeatedly	speaks	of	intuition's	putting	a	subject	"directly	in	touch"	with	a	perceptual	particular (13, 113, 147, 269). This	suggests	the	epistemic	gloss, whereby	intuition	provides	a	subject	with non-inferential	awareness	of	a	perceptual	particular. But	Allais	also	construes	the	immediacy of	intuition	in	terms	of	its	being	"object-dependent", in	that	"we	have	an	intuition	of	an	object only	when	that	object	is	in	fact	present	to	us: a	dream	or	a	hallucination	of	an	object	does	not count	as	an	outer	intuition"	(156). It	is	not	entirely	obvious	how	these	two	positions-viz. the epistemic	and	the	metaphysical-relate	to	one	another. Since	Allais ties the notions of immediacy and acquaintance together, there is a similar ambiguity	in	her	discussion	of	the	immediacy	of	presentation	as	to	whether	it	is	an	epistemic or	metaphysical	feature. The	gloss	of	immediacy	in	terms	of	the	object-dependence	of	intuition seems	metaphysical, in	that	it	is	making	a	claim	in	terms	of	a	necessary	condition	of	a	mental state's	being	an	intuition. This	is	further	supported	by	the	explanation	of	object-dependence	in terms	of constitution. Intuitions	depend	on	the	particulars	they	present	because	those	particulars are part of	the	intuition	(12, 105-7, 117, 197). In	this	way	intuitions	are	relations, which	have conscious	subjects	and	environmental	objects	(and	perhaps	more	besides)	as	relata. So	just	as Sue	cannot	be	taller	than	Tom	without	Tom's	existing, so	too	one	cannot	have	an	intuition	of	a	red ball	without	that	ball's	existing, being	red, and	being	a	part	of	the	subject's	current	environment (perhaps	glossed	in	terms	of	some	suitable	causal	relation	between	subject	and	object). The problem	is	that	this	is	all	so	much	metaphysics. It tells	us	nothing	as	to	why	something	that is	a	part	of	a	mental	state	should	be	something	that	is	also	epistemically	(i.e. non-inferentially) immediate	to	the	subject	of	that	state.1 For	example, the	limbic	system	is	a	part	of	me	(a	part	of	my	brain), but	this	fact	gives	me no	privileged	epistemic	access	either	to	it	or	to	its	functions. This	issue	of	the	relation	between constitution	and	privileged	epistemic	access	is	not	a	problem	peculiar	to	Allais'	reading	of	Kant, to	which	I am	in	fact	very	sympathetic, and	has	been	raised	with	respect	to	contemporary	forms of	perceptual	relationalism.2 But	it	would	be	helpful	to	hear	more	about	how	constitution	is supposed	to	do	its	epistemic	work	in	the	Kantian	context	she	discusses. Further, it	isn't	clear	what	object-dependence	has	to	do	with	singularity	as	Allais	conceives of	it. Allais	takes	the	two	notions	as	going	together	(153, 158). But	recall	that	singularity	for Allais	is	the	presentation	of	a	single	perceptual	unit, and	that	the	unit	can	itself	be	constituted by	any	number	of	objects	(e.g. a	desk	and	a	table), depending	on	the	animal	and	its	sensory	and environmental	relations	to	the	object. But	then	it	is	not	clear	how	the	perceptual	unit	that	is	a constituent	of	a	perceiving	subject's	consciousness	is	singular	in	the	sense	that	contrasts	with	the generality	of	concepts-viz. with	the	fact	that	a	concept	can	apply	to	a	potential	multiplicity 1 I assume	here that	Allais indicates that, at least, the token	mental state	one is in	depends	on the	existence	and presence	of the relevant	object, not	merely that the representational	content	of the state	depends	on the	object. Call	the	former	object-involvingness	and	the	latter	object-dependence	(see	(Martin 2002)). Since	Allais	construes Kant	as	a	kind	of	"relationalist"	about	perception	(12), she	denies	that	representational	content	plays	any	significant explanatory	role	in	accounting	for	perceptual	experience. So	she	cannot	explain	the	dependence	of	intuition	on	its object	in	terms	of	a	representational	content, but	rather	must	do	so	in	terms	of	the	direct	connection	between	the object	and	the	experience	itself. This	is	also	one	of	the	ways	in	which	Allais'	view	contrasts	with	Robert	Hanna's. According to	Hanna, an intuition is object-involving in virtue	of the	object-dependent singular representational content	it	possesses. 2 See, for	example, Cassam's	objections	to	Campbell	in	(Cassam 2011). 3	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear of	objects (157). This	worry	will	also	be relevant to	assessing	Allais'	claims	concerning the cognitive	role	of	intuition, to	which	we'll	now	turn. 2 The	Cognitive	Role	of	Intuition As	we've	seen, Allais	construes	the	givenness	of	an	object, or	perceptual	particular, in	intuition in terms	of a subject's	being	acquainted	with that	object. I suggested that	Allais' notion	of acquaintance	had	both	an	epistemic	and	a	metaphysical	aspect, though	it is	unclear	exactly how the two	are related. But	why	construe	giveness in these terms	at all? What cognitive requirement	does	acquaintance	satisfy? According	to	Allais'	Kant, we	need	acquaintance	with	objects	in	order	to	have	referential thoughts	about	them	(154-5, 168, 269-70, 289). Since	we	cannot	have	knowledge	of	objects without	being	able	to	refer	to	them, acquaintance	is	a	necessary	condition	of	all	knowledge. I am	very	sympathetic	to	Allais'	strategy	of	articulating	the	nature	of	intuition	by	appealing	to	its cognitive	role	in	Kant's	critical	philosophy. However, I think	there	are	some	important	questions surrounding	some	of	the	positions	she	ultimately	ascribes	to	Kant. In	the	next	two	subsections	I discuss	two	issues. First, I try	to	get	a	bit	clearer	as	to	whether it	is	actual	or	merely	possible	acquaintance	that	is	necessary	for	referential	thought, and	raise problems	for	Allais'	view	with	respect	to	the	two	possible	positions	she	might	take. Second, I look	at	the	acquaintance	condition	itself. I argue	that	Allais'	interpretation	of	the	acquaintance condition	is	too	strong, and	suggest	that	it	is	better	construed	as	concerning	cognition	rather than	thought. 2.1 Acquaintance: Actual	or	Possible? Allais'	account	of	the	importance	of	acquaintance	appears	at	times	to	vacillate	between	claiming	that actual acquaintance	is	necessary	for	referential	thought	and	claiming	that	merely	the possibility of acquaintance is	necessary. Russell, with	whom she	compares	Kant's view, required	actual	acquaintance	for	reference, famously	saying	that	"[e]very	proposition	which	we can	understand	must	be	composed	wholly	of	constituents	with	which	we	are	acquainted"	(Russell 1910): 117). Allais	suggests	that	she	endorses	a	similarly	strong	view	at	times, saying, for example	that	"[t]o	have	successful	referential	thought	it	is	necessary	that	I am	presented	with perceptual	particulars"	and	that	"concepts	will	lack	relation	to	objects	unless	they	apply	to	objects	which	are	given	to	us	in	empirical	intuition"	(270). She	also	says	that	intuition	"is	a	relation to	an	object	that...is	necessary	for	us	to	be	in	a	position	to	have	thought	about	the	object"	(163). These	remarks	suggest	that	Allais	interprets	Kant	as	endorsing	a	version	of	what	Gareth	Evans has	called	"Russell's	Principle", according	to	which	(singular)	reference	requires	possession	of identifying	knowledge	of	that	to	which	one	refers	((Evans 1982): 44). In	the	above	passages, Allais	seems	to	attribute	to	Kant	a	similar	principle-viz. that	a	necessary	condition	of	referential thought	of	a	particular	requires	that	one	be	in	a	position	to	distinguish	that	particular	from	all others. Acquaintance	with	the	relevant	particular	in	intuition	is	then, on	her	view, understood to	fulfill	that	role. However, Allais	also	clearly	says	that	it	is	only	the possibility of	acquaintance	that	is	required for	cognition	(14, 163, 303). A footnote	makes	this	explicit. 4	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear Kant	does	not	require	that	we	have	actual	acquaintance	with	all	the	things	we	can successfully	think	about; rather, it	must	be	possible	for	us	to	have	acquaintance with	an	object, and	the	object	must	be	causally	connected	to	one	with	which	we have	direct	acquaintance. (270, note	11) Allais	identifies	here	two	conditions	on	referential	thought	of	particulars-viz. (i)	possible	acquaintance; (ii)	casual	connection	with	something	with	which	one	is	"directly"	acquainted. I'm inclined	to	think	that	this	is	her	considered	view, though	it	would	be	helpful	to	see	this	point clarified. As	I understand	Allais	then, referential	thought	requires	either	acquaintance	with	the subject	matter	of	the	thought	or	acquaintance	with	something	that	is	appropriately	causally	connected	to	the	thought's	subject	matter. If	my	interpretation	of	her	is	correct	however, a	problem arises. Recall that the	motivation	Allais	presents for the	acquaintance	view	turns	on	the	"direct" or	"immediate"	way	in	which	it	puts	a	subject	"in	touch"	with	an	object. This	is	part	of	what is	supposed	to	separate	her	interpretation	of	perceptual	experience	(intuition)	as	acquaintance from	an	interpretation	of	perceptual	experience	as	always	being	of	some	causal	intermediary (159). Acquaintance	is	supposed	to	be	both	epistemically	secure, by	guaranteeing	the	existence of	its	object	(157)	and	is	also	the	best	explanation	of	the	singularity	of	intuition, since	according to	Allais	mental	intermediaries, such	as	images, cannot	be	singular	(158). Certainly, Allais'	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	acquaintance	for	referential	thought, as	opposed	to	a	view	based	on	the	representation	of	causal	intermediaries, comports	well	with	Kant's emphasis	on	the	inherent	uncertainty	of	causal	inference	and	of	the	immediacy	or	presence	of that	which	we	cognize	to	the	mind	(A368; B276). But	it	is	not	clear	how, on	Allais'	view, the mere	possibility	of	acquaintance, plus	casual	connection, could	do	the	cognitive	work	Allais wants	it	to	to	make	referential	thought	possible. For	example, while	is	true	that	Kant	does	allow for	the	legitimacy	of	inferences	from	our	immediate	experience	to	the	existence	of	objects	that are	only	mediately	available	to	us-this	is	the	point	of	Kant's	claim	concerning	the	possibility of	cognizing	the	existence	of	"magnetic	matter"	(A226/B273)-it	isn't	at	all	clear	that	such	inferences	are certain (Allais	seems	to	agree	on	this	point-see	pp. 157-8). And	here	a	difficulty awaits. On	the	one	hand, if	it	is	the	cognitive	intimacy	of	acquaintance, which	is	certain, that is	supposed	to	secure the	possibility	of reference, then	it is	difficult to	see	how	mere causal connection with	an	object	of	acquaintance	could	provide	the	requisite	security	for	singular	referential thought	of	something other	than that	object	of	acquaintance. On	the	other	hand, if causal	connection	rather	than	occurrent	acquaintance	were	sufficient	for	referential	thought	of an	object, then	it	wouldn't	be	clear	why	we	would	need	acquaintance	with	external	objects	in order	to	have	referential	thoughts	about	them. Acquaintance	with	sense-data	that	stand	in	the proper	casual	connection	to	external	objects	should	be	enough, but	this	is	a	position	that	Allais strongly	rejects	as	descriptive	of	Kant. Allais	might	respond	here	that	I am	ignoring	the	fact	that	causal	connection	isn't	sufficient, but	rather	necessary, along	with	the	possibility	of	acquaintance	itself. In	reply	I would	argue that	there	are	various	aspects	of	empirical	reality	that	are	impossible	for	one	to	be	acquainted with	(e.g. Kant's	"magnetic	matter", reality	at	the	quantum	level, etc.). Causal	connection	would thus	seem	to	be	one's	only	cognitive	link	in	such	cases. Would	that	be	sufficient	for	cognition? Again, as	above, I think	that	neither	a	negative	nor	an	affirmative	answer	here	is	particularly satisfactory. 5	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear Thus, though	I believe	that	according	to	Allais'	interpretation	only	the	possibility	of	acquaintance is	necessary for referential thought, I think that	her	adoption	of this	weaker	condition potentially	undercuts	the	motivation	for	endorsing	the	acquaintance	view	in	the	first	place. Alternatively, if	she	chooses	to	endorse	only	the	stronger	requirement	of	actual	acquaintance, then she	is	going	to	have	trouble	with	texts	in	which	Kant	seems	to	allow	referential	thought, and	perhaps	even	cognition, without	acquaintance	(e.g. magnetic	matter, fundamental	repulsive	forces, etc.). 2.2 Reference	and	Aboutness Apart	from	this	worry	about	possible	vs. actual	acquaintance, I also	have	doubts	that	acquaintance (or even its possibility), as conceived by	Kant, is a necessary condition of referential thought. According to	Allais'	Kant, referential thought is	a	condition	of	cognition, and	ultimately	of	knowledge, of	empirical	objects. I will	argue	that	Kant's	concern	in	the	Deduction	is	with	something	specific: what it	takes	for	thought	(concepts)	to	refer	to	an	object...For	Kant, referential	thought	is not	the	same	as	acquaintance	with	objects, and	it	is	not	required	to	have	acquaintance	with	objects, but	rather, is	dependent	on	our	having	acquaintance, but is also	dependent	on	the	application	of	the	categories. (168) Since	acquaintance	is	a	necessary	condition	of	referential	thought, it	is	therefore	a	condition	on	cognition	and	knowledge. What	does	Allais	mean	by	the	phrase	"referential	thought"? Consider	her	discussion	of	the	following	example. Suppose	I dream	about	a	man	living	in	Australia	who	wears	red	socks	every	day and	teaches	Anthropology. Suppose	further	that	there	is	exactly	one	man	living	in Australia	who	wears	red	socks	every	day	and	teaches	Anthropology. This	coincidence, one	might	think, is	not	enough	to	make	my	dream	about	that	particular	man. My	dream	lacks	the	right	kind	of	connection	to	the	man	to	be	about	him. Kant's concern	is	with	how	we	establish	the	kind	of	connection	needed	for	thoughts	to refer	to	objects. He	thinks	that	conceptual	thought	on	its	own	cannot	connect	to objects, which	is	why	it	cannot	constitute	cognition	proper: it	lacks	relation	to	an object. (269) From	this	example	involving	a	dream, Allais	clearly	indicates	that	it	is	not	enough	to	have	a referential	thought	that	one	have	a	thought	which	stakes	a	claim	about	some	subject	matter.3 She	instead	pushes	the	alternative	and	stronger	claim	that	referential	thought	is	thought	of	things with	which	one	is	(possibly)	acquainted	(270). 3 Compare	David	Kaplan's	discussion	of	"Newman	1", the	name	of	the	first	child	born	in	the	22nd century, in	(Kaplan 1968): 201	and	his	subsequent	denial	in	(Kaplan 1979): 397	that	one	need	be	"en	rapport"	with	an	object	to	assert something	of it. For	recent	treatment	of	these	issues	see	the	essays	collected	in	(Jeshion 2010). Concerning	Allais' use	of	the	dream	example	in	particular, one	might	object	that	it	is	not	obvious	that	one	can assert something	in	a dream. Hence	it	isn't	clear	that	what	drives	our	intuitions	concerning	whether	such	a	case	is	or	isn't	illustrative	of referential	thought	is	the	fact	that	the content of	one's	thought	in	such	a	case	isn't	referential, or	that	one	is	not	(and perhaps	never	could	be)	in	a	position	to assert the	content. Hence	there	is	an	ambiguity, perhaps	difficult	to	resolve, as	to	whether	it	is	the	content	or	the	attitude	that	is	doing	the	work	in	the	proposed	case. 6	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear In	what	follows	I make	two	points. First, I argue	that	Allais	conflates	(or	does	not	justify	the connection	between)	two	arguably	distinct	but	still	broadly	referential	notions-viz. satisfaction	and	constitution. There	are	good	philosophical	reasons	for	keeping	these	notions	distinct. Second, I argue	that	Kant	plausibly	recognizes	this	distinction, and	thus	allows	that	there	is	a form	of	referential	thought-or	"aboutness"	more	generally-without	acquaintance. In	the	end, I think	Allais'	point	about	the	cognitive	role	of	intuition, and	acquaintance	in	particular, is	best construed	in	terms	of cognition rather	than	(referential) thought. I take	these	points	in	turn. Start	with	the	notion	of	"aboutness." There	are	many	cases	in	which	a	subject	might	essay a	thought	about	something	in	the	world	even	if	she	is	not	in	a	position	to	independently	indicate	that	which	her	thought	is	about. Nevertheless, the	thought	has	a	subject	matter	and	either correctly	or	incorrectly	stakes	a	claim	about	that	subject	matter. For	example, one	might	think, upon	entering	St. Mark's	Basilica, that	the	tallest	person	in	Italy	would	seem	small	in	such	a	place. Assuming	that	there	is	just	one	such	person, one's	thought	would	make	a	claim, correctly	or	incorrectly, concerning	how	tall	that	person	would	seem	when	standing	in	St. Mark's. However, grasping	the	thought-understanding	the	claim	to	reality	that	the	thought	makes-does	not	require	any	antecedent	grasp	of	the	particular	Italian	person	(assuming	there	is	one)	who	satisfies that	thought. In	this	sense	a	thought	is	about	an	object-one	might	even	say	it	"refers", at	least in	a	weak	sense-just	in	case	the	object	satisfies	the	condition	set	out	in	the	thought. These conditions	of	satisfaction, along	with	the	world, determine	whether	such	thoughts	are	true	or false. In	the	case	where	there	is	no	unique	object	for	the	thought	to	be	about, either	because of	a	plurality	of	satisfiers	or	because	of	a	total	lack	of	satisfiers, the	thought	would	be	graspable but	simply	false. Going	back	to	Allais'	dream	example, suppose	the	dream	was	not	of a man	who	wears	red socks, is	an	anthropologist, etc. but	rather	was	of the man	who	wears	red	socks, etc. In	the case	of	there	being	just	one	such	man, then	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	dream	was about	that man, and	specifically	because	that	particular	Australian	man	satisfies	the	conditions	set	out	by the	content	of	the	dream. In	the	case	there	was	no	such	man, then	the	dream	would	simply	be making	false	claims. Contrast	this	"satisfactional"	way	which	a	thought	might	be	about	the	world	with	a	much more	stringent	notion, according	to	which	a	thought	is	about	something	only	if	that	thing	constitutively	enters	into	the	content	of	the	thought, such	that	one	could	not	grasp	the	thought	without thereby	knowing	which	thing	in	the	world	the	thought	is	about.4 In	the	case	where	there	is	no such	thing, there	is	no	corresponding	thought	to	think. This	is	in	contrast	to	the	notion	of	satisfactional	thought	outlined	just	above. Satisfactional	thought, lacking	a	unique	thing	to	be	about, ends	up	merely	false. In	the	case	of	more	stringent	constitutive	notion	of	thought, when	there is	no	relevant	object	there	is	no	thought	at	all. Call	this	the	"constitutive"	view	of	thought. Now, it	seems	to	me	to	be	a	largely	terminological	issue	as	to	which	notion-viz. the	satisfactional	or	the	constitutive	view-should	properly	receive	the	moniker	"referential	thought." Perhaps	they	both	should. Allais	seems	to	want	to	deny	that	satisfactional	thought	deserves	the honorific	"referential." Perhaps	that	is	right. But	be	that	as	it	may, I am	not	clear	that	any	argument	is	provided	by	her	for	the	position	that	satisfactional	thought	is	wholly	lacking	in	aboutness. Nor	is	there	a	clear	argument	from	the	position	that	thought	is	satisfactional	in	nature	to	the	conclusion	that	satisfactional	thought	depends	on	referential	thought, and	perhaps	ultimately	on 4 See	(Evans 1982): 44; cf. (Hawthorne	and	Manley 2012): 5-6. 7	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear acquaintance. Certainly, the	popularity	of	such	a	view	amongst	contemporary	philosophers, from	Strawson	to	McDowell, attests	to	its	attractiveness,5 but	it	would	be	helpful	to	see	the	view set	out	in	more	detail. So	far, I've	discussed	a	way	in	which	I think	Allais'	use	of	"referential	thought"	is	somewhat ambiguous, and	presented	some	argument	for	why	one	might	think	that	a	thought	can	be	about something	whether	or	not	it	is	"referential"	in	Allais'	stringent	constitutive	sense. But	there	is also	the	question	of	whether	this	distinction	is	plausibly	attributible	to	Kant. I believe	that	it	is. Allais, I think, is	correct	to	claim	that	Kant	construes	the	capacity	for	referential	thought	of objects	(in	the	stringent	"constitutive"	sense	outlined	above)	as, in	some	way, dependent	on	a more	fundamental	capacity	to	intuit	objects	in	sensory	experience. This	is	at	least	in	part	due to	the	fact	that	Kant	denies	that	there	are	any	genuinely	singular	concepts	(B683-4; JL 9:91, 97), so	in	singular	judgments	(e.g. that a	is	F) the	subject	concept a is	not	itself	a	genuinely	singular concept, but	only	one	that	is	playing	the	subject	role	in	that	particular	judgment-it	is	"singular in	use"	in	Kant's	phrase	(JL 9:91).6 But	since	Kant	never	clarifies	what	he	means	by	making	a concept	singular	in	use, it isn't	clear	how	descriptive	thought	about	the	world-thought	that latches	on	to	its	subject	matter	via	satisfaction	conditions-must	depend	on	singular	thought- thought	that	latches	on	to	the	world	in	a	constitutive	manner.7 We	moderns	now	have	a	relatively	clear	explanation	of	the	difference	between	satisfactional and	constitutive thought	based	on the	manner in	which	an	object	figures in the	proposition constituting	the	content	of	the	thought.8 But	this	distinction	is	not	obviously	one	that	we	can attribute	to	Kant. Since, for	Kant, the	content	of	thought	(or, in	his	terminology, of	judgment) is	always	conceptual	(CJ §35	5:287; see	also	B146, B283; JL 9:101; LL 24:928), and	concepts never	have	objects	as	constituents,9 there	is	no	way	in	which	Kant	could	allow	that	there	is	singular	thought in	our	contemporary	sense. The	closest	that	Kant	might	get	to	our	contemporary conception	is	his	notion	of cognition as	a	complex	form	of	representation	requiring	a	combination	of	intuition	and	concept. Intuition	might	then	be	the	psychological	analogue	to	what	we now	call	"devices	of	direct	reference"	(e.g. demonstratives	and	other	indexicals, names, etc.), which	would	contribute	some	specific	individual	to	cognition, and	which	satisfies	the	conditions (in	successful	cognition)	set	by the	concept	or	conceptual judgment. So, according to this	model, unlike	the	conceptual	content	of	thought, which	determines	its	object	by	means	of setting	conditions	which	the	object	may	or	may	not	satisfy, in cognition intuition	contributes	its referent	directly	to	the	propositional	content	of	the	cognition, which	is	a	combination	(in	some manner)	of	both	concepts	(judgment)	and	intuition.10 5 See, for	example, (Strawson 1959): 19-23; (McDowell 1998): ch. 11; (Brewer 1999): xiv-xv	and	ch. 2. 6 See	the	classic	discussion	in	(Thompson 1972). 7 Certainly, there	is	also	a	further	constraint	on	our	descriptive	thought, at	least	as	far	as	Kant	is	concerned-viz. the fact that it	depends	for its	content	on	concepts	that	are	abstracted	from	experience	as	"reflected	representations" generated	by	acts	of	comparison, reflection, and	abstraction	(JL §§8-9). 8 See	the	overview	of	these	issues	by	David	Kaplan, who	was	perhaps	one	of	the	most	influential	contributors	to	this debate, in	(Kaplan 1989): 568-9. 9 There	is	some	dispute	as	to	whether	and	how	a	concept	might	have	a	non-logical	extension	(i.e. an	extension	which does	not	itself	consist	of	concepts). For	recent	discussion	see	(Anderson 2015): 61-70. 10 It	is	this	model	that	drives	Hanna's	conception	of	the	semantic	structure	of	intuitional	content, as	well	as	its	contribution	to	cognition. See	(Hanna 1993); (2001):196-7; (2005): 258	and	note	29. 8	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear Even	if	something	like	this	were	the	correct	thing	to	say	about	Kant's	conception	of cognition, it	would	not	show	that	satisfactional	thought	depends	on	constitutive	thought	(or	cognition, as I have	now	suggested). It	would, rather, only	show	that	cognition	depends	on the	semantic contributions	made	by	intuition, which	is	important, but	plausibly	less	demanding	than	Allais' original	interpretive	claim. I think	that	similar	issues	beset	Allais'	contention	that, for	Kant, satisfactional	thought	depends	ultimately	not	just	on	constitutive	thought, but	also	on	acquaintance. Again, this	seems to	be	a	condition	that	sits	better	with	Kant's	conception	of	cognition	rather	than	thought, and it	need	not	deny	what	Allais	seems	set	on	denying, that	a	thought	could	be	about	its	subject matter	even	if	the	thinker	fails	to	be	acquainted	with	that	subject	matter. Concerning	these	points, consider	Kant's	stance	concerning	the theoretically	unverifiable but	still	rationally	legitimate	status	of	beliefs	concerning	God	and	the	non-empirical	self. The fact	that	we	cannot	have	any	sensory	consciousness	of	such	entities	does	not	entail, for	Kant, that	we	cannot	have thoughts	about them. If it	did then	how	would it	be	possible to	hope (i.e. bear	a	distinctive	kind	of	doxastic	attitude	towards	a	content), for	example, that	one's	soul survive's	the	death	of	one's	body, or that	God	apportions	happiness	to	virtue? That	Kant did find	such thoughts	coherent, and	as	delimiting	a	specific	subject	matter, suggests that	while we	may	not	have	any	acquaintance	with	our	own	(or	others')	soul(s)	or	God's	existence, we may	nevertheless	be	able	to	think	of	those	things	by	staking	a	claim	about	the	relevant	subject matter-i.e. by	specifying	conditions	under	which	those	objects, if	they	exist, would	fall. For	all	these	reasons	I believe	that	Kant	(i)	primarily	conceives	of	thought	satisfactionally; (ii) allows	that	we	might	have	satisfactional	thought	of	a	subject	matter	even	under	conditions	in which	no	intuition-and	so	no	acquaintance-with	the	relevant	subject	matter	is	possible; (iii) cannot	plausibly	construe	thought	as	dependent	on	acquaintance. However, I think	much	of Allais'	view	could	be	retained	if	we	read	it	as	setting	conditions	on cognition and	its	relation	to knowledge, rather	than	on	thought	more	generally. 3 Idealism	and	Individuation A final	worry	concerns	what	we	might	call	the	"fit"	between	what	is	given	in	intuition	and	what is	cognized	as	the	result	of	cooperation	between	intuitive	and	conceptual	representation. Allais says	that, [a]cquaintance (unlike	merely	having	a concept) is a relation to	an	object that guarantees	the	existence	of	the	object	and	which	individuates	a	specific	particular. (14) Recall, however, that	the	particular	so	presented	may	in	fact	consist	of	multiple	objects. It	might, for	example, consist	of	a	desk	and	a	table-a	"desk-table"-as	far	as	the	intuition	is	concerned. This	is	compatible	with	Allais'	claim	that, subjects	have	ways	of	discriminating	individual things	from	other things, of	perceiving	their	boundaries, and	of	representing	them	as	unified, discrete, and	distinct	from	each	other	and	from	the	subject	that	are	independent	of	conceptualising. (167) 9	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear The	"unified, discrete, and	distinct"	objects	may	be	things	like	desk-tables	and	rock-trees. Objects	need	not	obviously	be	presented	in	intuition	as	the	discrete	particulars	that	we	think	about in	everyday	life. This	point	might	seem	to	lend	support	to	Allais'	interpretation	of	the	role	of	concepts, specifically	the	categories, in	our	thought	of	objects. According	to	that	view, the	categories	exclude "gerrymandered"	properties	and	objects	as	candidates	for	cognition, including	"mereological sums	which	do	not	correspond	to	what	we	ordinarily	think	of	as	objects"	(277-81). The	categories	are	supposed	to	set	limits	concerning	"what	counts	as	a	subject	of	properties"	as	well	as "what	counts	as	more	than	one	property	belonging	to	the	same	object"	(282). However, Allais	also	wants	to	deny	that	the	categories'	playing	this	role	entails	any	further form	of	idealism. Kant's	idealism, on	her	view, is	set	at	the	level	of	intuition-all	givenness	to cognition	is	conditioned	by	our	forms	of	intuition, so	all	objects	of	cognition	must ipso	facto be ideal. Intuition	thus	plays	the	metaphysically	crucial	role	in	determining	the	idealist	status	of the	phenomenal	world. The	role	of	the	categories	in	providing	"relation	to	an	object"	is	thereby solely	epistemological	and	not	metaphysical	(285). What	confuses	me	about the	resulting	view	is	how	intuition	is	both	supposed	to	provide a	determinate	semantic	contribution	to	thought, in	virtue	of	a	particular's	being	presented	in intuition, while	simultaneously	being	unable	to	determine	how	it	is	that	one	should	think	of	the object	so	presented. Allais	might	be	thought	to	anticipate	this	objection	when	she	says	that, Kant's	claim	that	combination	is	not	given	can	be	understood	as	saying	that	how we	group	objects in regarding them	as falling	under	a	common	property is	not presented in perception; there are indefinitely many predicates corresponding to possible	ways	we could group or classify the objects that are given in intuition...Crucially, this	point	is	fully	consistent	with	thinking	that	intuition	presents us	with	perceptual	particulars: being	presented	with	a	red	apple	in	intuition	does not	determine	whether	or	not	we	will	group	it	together	(unify	it)	with	other	things by	bringing	it	under	the	concept	"red", the	concept	"is	50	miles	from	a	burning barn", or	the	concept	"round	if	red	and	square	if	green". (278) This	way	of	putting	her	position	seems	to try	and	have	things	both	ways. On	the	one	hand, Allais	needs	it	to	be	the	case	that	the	mind	is	presented	in	intuition	with	determinate	perceptual	particulars	(e.g. the	red	apple), for	it	is	the	fact	of	our	acquaintance	with	such	particulars that	makes	it	the	case	that	we	can	have	referential	thoughts	of	them. On	the	other	hand, the particulars	so	presented	do	not	themselves	determine	which	of	a	class	of	gerrymandered	vs. nongerrymandered	concepts	is	correct. For	that	we	need	the	categories. While	I don't	think	there is	anything	logically	inconsistent	about	adopting	these	two	positions-perhaps	reference	is	one thing, and	predication	another-they	do	strike	me	as	being	in	tension. The	issue	is	that	the	semantic	function	that	Allais	seems	to	see	acquaintance	playing	requires	that	a	determinate	object be	contributed	to	the	content	of	cognition. This	is	part	of	what	makes	intuition	an	immediate, direct	apprehension	of	a	thing	rather	than	a	merely	specificational	representation	of	some	(putatively)	possible	object. What	the	categories	do, on	Allais'	view, is	then	provide	the	boundaries of	what	could	be	an	acceptable	conceptualization	of	what is	already	determinately	given	in intuition. The	problem	is	that, as	Allais	admits, intuition doesn't give	a	perfectly	determinate	object or	"particular." Instead, the	particular	given	in intuition	is	determined	by	the	subject's	basic 10	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear measure, which	can	vary	with	context	and	might	be	quite	coarse-grained	in	extent. As	discussed in	§1	above, the	particular	might	perhaps	consist	of	multiple	distinct	objects, so that	a rock and	the	tree	growing	from	it	are	presented	in	intuition	as	one	particular-a	"rock-tree"	fusion, so	to	speak. Now	it	is	no	longer	clear	how	intuition	performs	its	required	semantic	function. What is	presented-i.e. what is	contributed to the	semantic	content	of	cognition-is	a rocktree, not	a	rock	and	a	tree	(as	distinct	objects). But	the	presentation	of	a	rock-tree	presumably licenses	different	referential	thoughts	than	presentation	of	a	rock	and	a	tree. In	order	for	intuition to	present two distinct and	determinate	objects-the rock and the tree-we	would	need to appeal	to	the	kinds	of	individuating	conditions	offered	by	the	categories. But	that	means	that the	categories	don't	just	epistemically	constrain	what	sort	of	kinds	an	object	may	fall	under, but that	they	actually	determine	what	kinds	of	semantic	contribution	an	intuition	might	make	to cognition. And	this	seems	to	push	in	the	direction	of	the	sort	of	"sensory	mush"	view	(148-9, 153)	that	Allais	wants	to	deny. References Anderson, R Lanier. 2015. The	Poverty	of	Conceptual	Truth: Kant's	Analytic/Synthetic	Distinction	and	the	Limits	of	Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Brewer, Bill. 1999. Perception	and	Reason. New	York: Oxford	University	Press. Cassam, Quassim. 2011. "Tackling	Berkeley's	Puzzle." In Perception, Causation, and	Objectivity, edited	by	Johannes	Roessler, Hemdat	Lerman, and	Naomi	Eilan, 18–34. Oxford: Oxford University	Press. Evans, Gareth. 1982. The	Varieties	of	Reference. Edited	by	John	McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University	Press. Golob, Sacha. 2011. "Kant	on	Intentionality, Magnitude, and	the	Unity	of	Perception." European	Journal	of	Philosophy 22	(4): 505–28. Hanna, Robert. 1993. "Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive	Theory of Demonstratives." Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly 74	(2): 96–117. ---. 2001. Kant	and	the	Foundations	of	Analytic	Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford	University Press. ---. 2005. "Kant	and	Nonconceptual	Content." European	Journal	of	Philosophy 13	(2): 247–90. Hawthorne, John	P,	and	David	Manley. 2012. The	Reference	Book. Oxford: Oxford	University Press. Jeshion, Robin, ed. 2010. New	Essays	on	Singular	Thought. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Kaplan, David. 1968. "Quantifying	in." Synthese 19	(1-2): 178–214. ---. 1979. "Dthat." In Contemporary	Perspectives	in	the	Philosophy	of	Language, edited 11	| 12 Acquaintance	and	Cognition: Comments	on	Allais, Manifest	Reality Colin	McLear by	Peter	A.	French, Theodore	E.	Uehling, and	Howard	K.	Wettstein, 383–400. Minneapolis: The	University	of	Minnesota	Press. ---. 1989. "Afterthoughts." In Themes	from	Kaplan, edited	by	Joseph	Almog, John	Perry, and	Howard	Wettstein, 565–614. New	York: Oxford	University	Press. Martin, Michael	G.F.	2002. "Particular	Thoughts	&	Singular	Thought." Royal	Institute	of	Philosophy	Supplement 51: 173–214. McDowell, John. 1998. Meaning, Knowledge, and	Reality. Cambridge: Harvard	University Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1910. "Knowledge	by	Acquaintance	and	Knowledge	by	Description." Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society 11: 108–28. Strawson, Peter	Frederick. 1959. Individuals: An	Essay	in	Descriptive	Metaphysics. London: Routledge. Thompson, Manley. 1972. "Singular	Terms	and	Intuitions	in	Kant's	Epistemology." The	Review of	Metaphysics 26	(2): 314–43. 12	|